Advanced search Subscribe to our newsletter and you'll continuously be informed about our new books, series and journals. You can customize this e-mail newsletter to your particular needs and interests. Newsletters include special discount codes. To subscribe or change existing preferences press the subscribe button	The Knowledge of Good. Critique of Axiological Reason. HARTMAN, Robert S., Arthur ELLIS and Rem B. EDWARDS Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2002, XIV, 470 pp. Expanded translation from the Spanish by Robert S. Hartman. Edited by Arthur R. Ellis and Rem B. Edwards Hb: 978-90-420-1220-2 / 90-420-1220-X € 100 / US$ 135 Series: Value Inquiry Book Series 126 Hartman Institute Axiology Studies This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson. Contents: Rem B. Edwards : Editorial Foreword Acknowledgments Part I: The Order of Value Reason ONE The Knowledge of Value TWO The Levels of Value Language THREE: Value Science and Natural Science FOUR: Moore’s Metaethics: The Science of Good Part II: Reason and Reasons of Value FIVE: Non-Cognitivists and Semi-Cognitivists SIX: Naturalistic Cognitivists SEVEN: Non-Naturalistic Cognitivists Part III: The Value of Reason EIGHT: The Axiological Value of Reason NINE: The Symbolization of Value TEN: The Measurement of Value ELEVEN: The Formalization of Value Notes Bibliography About the Author and the Editors Index ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND THE EDITORS ROBERT S. HARTMAN was Research Professor of Philosophy at The University of Tennessee and at the National University of Mexico when he died on September 20, 1973. He was buried near his home in Cuernavaca, Mexico. He was born in Berlin on January 27, 1910. He attended the German College of Political Science, the University of Paris, the London School of Economics, and Berlin University, where he received he LL.B. in 1932. For a brief period, he taught at Berlin University and served as an assistant district court judge. Hartman's rejection of Fascism, which he expressed in speeches and articles, brought him into conflict with the Nazi party and forced him to leave Germany, using a fake passport, in 1932. He legally changed his name, which originally was Robert Schirokauer, to the name on his passport, Robert S. (for Schirokauer) Hartman. In 1938, using a Swedish alien’s passport, he and his wife, the former Rita Emanuel, and son, Jan, left Europe for Mexico, where they lived until their immigration in 1941 to the United States, where they later became citizens. Hartman’s first teaching position in the United States was at Lake Forest Academy in Illinois. While there, he enrolled at Northwestern University where he received his Ph.D. in 1946. He taught at the College of Wooster in Ohio from 1945–1948, and at the Ohio State University from 1948–1956. He was a visiting professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955– 1956, and at Yale, 1966. He was Smith Mundt State Department Research Fellow and Exchange Professor at the National University of Mexico, 1956– 1957. He held more than fifty lectureships in the United States, Canada, Latin America, and Europe. He was a research professor of philosophy at the National University of Mexico from 1957 until his death in 1973, and at The University of Tennessee from 1968–1973. Hartman’s formal axiology, as the ordering logic for the value sciences, was developed in many published articles and received its most complete expression in his major work, The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967). In the field of psychology he applied formal axiology in “The Hartman Value Profile,” a value test widely used in Mexico and by psychiatrists, psychologists, and business consultants in the United States. Since Hartman’s untimely death, his work has been carried on by members of the Robert S. Hartman Institute, composed of former colleagues, students, and many others who have been deeply influenced by the man and his thinking. Members of the Institute have posthumously published many of his writings, as well as critical studies and applications of his work. These include his autobiography, Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story, ed. Arthur R. Ellis (Amsterdam—Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1994), and two books containing previously unpublished essays and contemporary critical reactions to his positions—Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and Applications, eds. Rem B. Edwards and John W. Davis (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991) and Formal Axiology and Its Critics, ed. Rem B. Edwards (Amsterdam—Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1995). Several other books based on Hartman’s work have also been published in the Hartman Institute Studies in Axiology special series of the Value Inquiry Book Series. ARTHUR R. ELLIS is a Licensed Professional Counselor who has been a clinician since 1971. He holds degrees in psychology (B.S.) and rehabilitation counseling (M.S.) from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, and counseling (Ph.D.) from LaSalle University. Since 1976, he has worked in the Psychology Service of a Veterans Affairs Medical Center. He studied formal axiology under Robert S. Hartman, who personally trained him in the use and interpretation of the “Hartman Value Profile.” His research has included explorations of the value patterns of alcoholics. Dr. Ellis has been an active member of the Robert S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology, serving on the Board of Directors, holding the positions of Executive Director and President, and being recognized as a Fellow of the Institute. In 1994, Ellis edited Robert S. Hartman’s autobiographical manuscript, Freedom to Live: The Robert Hartman Story, for publication. Dr. Ellis is a Master Addictions Counselor, a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association, and a Professional Member of the American Mental Health Counselors Association. REM B. EDWARDS received his A.B. degree from Emory University in 1956, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. During graduate school he was a Danforth Graduate Fellow. He received a B.D. degree from Yale University Divinity School in 1959 and a Ph.D. from Emory University in 1962. He taught for four years at Jacksonville University in Florida, moved from there to the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in 1966, and retired from there partly in 1997 and partly in 1998. He continues to be professionally active and kept an office on the University campus until the end of May, 2000. He was a U.T. Chancellor’s Research Scholar in 1985 and a Lindsay Young Professor from 1987 to 1998. His areas of specialization are Philosophy of Religion, American Philosophy, Ethical Theory, Medical Ethics with a special interest in Mental Health Care, Ethics and Animals, and Formal Axiology. He is the author or editor of sixteen books, including Reason and Religion (New York: Harcourt, 1972 and Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1979); Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979); with Glenn Graber, BioEthics (San Diego: Harcourt, 1988); with John W. Davis, Forms of Value and Valuation: Theory and Applications (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991); Formal Axiology and Its Critics (Amsterdam—Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1995); Violence, Neglect, and the Elderly, co-edited with Roy Cebik, Glenn Graber, and Frank H. Marsh (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1996); New Essays on Abortion and Bioethics (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1997); Ethics of Psychiatry: Insanity, Rational Autonomy, and Mental Health Care (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1997); Values, Ethics, and Alcoholism, co-edited with Wayne Shelton (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1997); Bioethics for Medical Education, co-edited with Dr. Edward Bittar (Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 1999); Religious Values and Valuations (Chattanooga, Tenn.: Paidia Publishing Co, 2000); What Caused the Big Bang? (Amsterdam—New York: Editions Rodopi, 2001); and, with Thomas M. Dicken, Dialogues on Values and Centers of Value: Old Friends, New Thoughts (Amsterdam—New York: Editions Rodopi, 2001). Edwards is also the author of over sixty articles and reviews, including “How Process Theology Can Affirm Creation Ex Nihilo,” Process Studies, 29:1 (2000), pp. 77–96. He is an Associate Editor with the Value Inquiry Book Series, published by Editions Rodopi, where he is responsible for the Hartman Institute Axiological Studies special series. For a number of years he was co-editor of the Advances in Bioethics book series published by JAI Press. Edwards has been the President of the Tennessee Philosophical Association (1973–1974), the Society for Philosophy of Religion (1981–1982), and the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (1984–1985). He is a Charter Member and Fellow of the Robert S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology, has served on its Board of Directors since 1987, and since 1989 has been its Secretary-Treasurer. He chairs the committee that established and maintains the website for the Robert S. Hartman Institute at: http://www.hartmaninstitute.org EDITORIAL FOREWORD Early in 1999 Dr. David Mefford found in his files part of a book manuscript that Robert S. Hartman gave to him some time before his death on 20 September 1973. David passed it along to Dr. Arthur Ellis, who diligently searched for a more complete manuscript in the Hartman archives in the Hoskins Special Collections Library at The University of Tennessee where, before her death, Mrs. Rita Hartman sent all of her husbands papers and manuscripts. There, Art eventually found an extensively revised and finished copy of the manuscript of the present book, which Bob Hartman apparently completed shortly before his death. In June of 2001, Gary Acquaviva alerted us to the possibility that this might be a translation of Robert S. Hartman’s El Conoci-mimento del Bien: Crítica dela Razón Axiologica, originally published in Spanish in Mexico City–Buenos Aires by the Fondo de Cultura Económica in 1965, copyrighted by Hartman himself. Up to this point, the editors were proceeding on the assumption that this was a new book that Hartman completed just before his death. Our reason for thinking so was that he refers frequently in it to his own The Structure of Value, published in 1967. It now appears, thanks to Gary Acquaviva’s information, that it is indeed an extensively revised translation of his El Conocimimento del Bien: Crítica dela Razón Axiologica which Hartman translated, updated, and completed shortly before his death, but it is not a previously unpublished book. The first edition was published in Spanish by the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Fondo de Cultura Económica of Mexico City and Buenos Aires in their Dianoia series (1965). Many thanks to the Editors at Dianoia for their kind permission to publish in English this expanded translation of Hartman’s book. The immense significance of this book for formal axiology was readily apparent to the editors, even from a cursory examination of the manuscript; and Art Ellis and Rem B. Edwards agreed to edit it for publication in the Hartman Institute Studies in Axiology special series of the Value Inquiry Book Series. This proved to be a mammoth undertaking for both editors. First, the library copy of the manuscript was photocopied, no easy task since Hartman usually filled every page completely and left absolutely no margins on the sides or at the top and bottom of his pages. This photocopy was then scanned to get a version of it onto a computer disk. Unfortunately, the typewriter Hartman used to produce his original manuscript had a well-used ribbon that printed only dimly and with many broken letters, so the scanned version was a total mess requiring literally months of work just to make the computer version readable and faithful to the original. Many additional months of effort went into editing it to conform to the exacting editorial standards of the Value Inquiry Book Series. Hartman’s voluminous footnotes contained both reference materials and substantive comments. As Rodopi requires, the substantive comments have been integrated into the main text, and the references were converted from footnotes into endnotes. In providing documentation, Hartman gave only the year and place of publication but never the publisher of a book; he usually gave only the last name of authors of books and articles; and he often omitted page numbers. All of this information had to be looked up, completed, and corrected. In the very few instances where Hartman’s sources could not be traced, relevant notes will give all the information Hartman made available. We editors now feel like we have been wrestling for well over two years with the Great Leviathan of Axiology! Despite all the difficulties, we are convinced that this book contributes significantly to the philosophical defense and development of Robert S. Hartman’s formal axiology. In it, Hartman takes on practically everyone who was anyone in value theory at the middle of the 20th century; and he shows exactly where everyone went astray or fell short in light of formal axiology. Even a partial list of those he takes on is impressive. Proceeding alphabetically with a very incomplete list, Hartman draws what he can from, but then trounces A. J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, R. B. Braithwaite, Daniel Christoff, Felix S. Cohen, Donald Davidson, Abraham Edel, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, Herbert Feigl, William K. Frankena, Risieri Frondizi, A. C. Garnett, Everett W. Hall, Stuart Hampshire, Ingemar Hedenius, R. M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Thomas Hill, A. L. Hilliard, Henry Lanz, C. I. Lewis, G. E. Moore, Henry Margenau, Charles W. Morris, F. S. C. Northrop, P. H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, A. N. Prior, D. D. Raphael, Bertrand Russell, Charles Stevenson, Patrick Suppes, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, J. O. Urmson, and Georg Henrik von Wright. French, German, Italian, and Spanish speaking value theorists are also much better represented in the book itself than in the preceding list. If, as Robert S. Hartman maintained, goodness is complete concept or standard fulfillment, we can assess the goodness or adequacy of a philosophical position only by applying to it a well developed concept of good-making criteria. Good philosophy incorporates conceptual clarity, logical consistency, systematic orderliness, comprehensive inclusiveness, immense explanatory power, faithfulness to experience, relevant applicability, intuitive allure, and fruitfulness in guiding future research. A good philosophy is creatively insightful; it goes further, sees further, illuminates more, pushes back more darkness than other perspectives. It persuasively identifies and illuminates the errors and confusions of its competition. In all these respects, the axiology developed in this book and in other writings by Robert S. Hartman is good philosophy. This book especially is a powerful defense of formal axiology as the premier value theory of the twentieth century. Prior to the publication of this book, professional philosophers have neglected Robert S. Hartman. With its publication, they can no longer afford to do so. This does not mean that Hartman is above reproach, that he did not make mistakes, or that he solves all the problems associated with human values and valuations. It does mean, speaking metaphorically, that he is a heavyweight champion in axiology, or, to use a metaphor he would have preferred, he is a virtuoso. The editors of this book regret that finding the book manuscript and bringing it to the public took so long. We greatly appreciate Robert Ginsberg and the staff at Editions Rodopi for all their support of our efforts and for publishing this and all the other books now existing in the Hartman Institute Axiology Studies special series. Art Ellis is grateful for technical support from Steve Hrivnak and Lori Bouton. Thanks also to Dr. Mark A. Moore for paying the permission-to-quote fees. Rem B. Edwards Lindsay Young Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus The University of Tennessee EXCERPT What makes Moore’s theory superior is, precisely, that Moore does not give the term “good” any specific meaning. This is what enables Hill to apply Moore’s theory to the other theories, all of which do give the term a specific meaning. Moore’s theory is more formal. It is on a higher level of discourse than the other theories discussed. It deals not with things that are good but with the predicate “good” as such. It is meta?ethics rather than ethics. Hill’s failure to consider this formal rather than material difference between Moore’s and other ethical theories—in line with the general practice in ethics—made his own attempt to construct a moral theory on the basis of Moore’s “prolegomena” something of a failure. The practical part of Hill’s Ethics in Theory and Practice is in no way different from that of other ethics texts and has no coherent connection with Moore’s theory. Neither Hill’s nor any other extant surveys of ethical theories supersede methodologically their subject matter. They are analytic enumerations but not synthetic constructions. They choose as their own point of view one of the theories they discuss. Theirs is not a “way out” of the impasse in ethics but rather a way into it. They do not break up ethical argument into primary qualities in accordance with a higher logical system. They merely rearrange the secondary qualities they find. Theirs are useful summaries, not new departures. They are not critiques in the sense of Kant or Galileo, or even of Moore, since they lack the vision of a new science. They are collections of ethics, not interpretations of ethics in the light of metaethics. Formal axiology is at least a metaethics. For this reason the axiological fallacies it provides as instruments of critique are nothing but expressions of the logical levels of axiological thinking, the orders of value reason. They indicate clearly the confusions, as well as the distinctions, made in the use of the levels of value language. G. E. Moore both initiated the critique of value theories, in terms of his fallacy, and had the vision of a science of values—in terms of which, alone, the philosophical procedure in axiology is fallacious. He was not, however, clear about his own method, especially, the meta?ethical nature of his procedure: that his was a discussion about ethics, not an ethical discussion. He committed the moral fallacy throughout. He did not realize that a science is always on a higher logical level than the preceding philosophy—on the level of variables in terms of which the concepts of the preceding philosophy become logical values. I hold that “good,” in a science of values, must be that variable the logical values of which are axiological values. Moore was not aware of the levels of value language, the knowledge of which is yet the indispensable tool for the creation of any science of value. We must, therefore, in the next two chapters, first examine these levels and then crystallize the methodological core of Moore’s contribution. 59. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 20. 60. Thomas Hill, Ethics in Theory and Practice (New York: Crowell, 1956). 61. Robert S. Hartman, “Value, Fact and Science,” Philosophy of Science, 25 (April 1958), pp. 97–108; The Structure of Value, pp. 215–228; and Paul W. Taylor, “The Normative Function of Metaethics,” Philosophical Review, 67 (January 1958), p. 29. 62. Hartman, The Structure of Value, pp. 58–60. Chapter Two	Tijnmuiden 7 1046 AK Amsterdam The Netherlands T: +31-20-611 48 21 F: +31-20-447 29 79 248 East 44th Street - 2nd floor New York, NY 10017 USA T: 1-800-225-3998 F: 1-800-853-3881 Toll-free in the USA info@rodopi.nl