|
Subscribe to our newsletter and you'll continuously
be informed about our new books, series and journals.
You can customize this e-mail newsletter to your particular
needs and interests.
Newsletters include special discount codes.
To subscribe or change existing preferences press the subscribe button
|
|
|
|
|
Addresses of the Mississippi Philosophical Association.
CROCKETT Jr., Bennie R. ( Ed.)
Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA, 2000, XXVIII, 341 pp.
|
Series:
Value Inquiry Book Series 102
Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies
Addresses of the Mississippi Philosophical Association is a collection of presidential and invited addresses from the members of the Mississippi Philosophical Association (MPA). Papers date from the inception of the association in the mid-1940s and continue through 1999. The common thread in these addresses is the authors' service to or leadership in the MPA. The content and methods in the chapters are diverse, including addresses on ethics, political philosophy, history of philosophy, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, and philosophical theology. Some unique features of this book are a history of the MPA, biographical sketches and photographs of each contributor, and the inclusion of the unpublished 1988 Dunbar Lectures from Millsaps College and the unpublished 1992 Akin Lecture from Mississippi College. These essays and lectures reveal the vitality of philosophy in the colleges and universities of Mississippi. As part of the special series, Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies in the larger Value Inquiry Book Series, this book documents - in a unique historical format - the value and vitality of a state philosophical organization.
“There has been no attempt to mold these addresses into a unity; rather, the addresses offer a glimpse of the pluralistic philosophical reflection among the philosophical faculties of the private colleges and public universities in the state of Mississippi. To the surprise of some people, philosophy is alive, well, diverse, and flourishing in Mississippi!” (from the Preface).
Contents: Dedication. List of Illustrations. Editorial Foreword. Preface. Acknowledgments. INTRODUCTION Robert E. BERGMARK: Mississippi Philosophical Association: A Historical Statement. ONE Autobiographical Sketch. N. BOND FLEMING: Science and the Modern World. TWO Autobiographical Sketch. Robert E. BERGMARK: Knowledge, Belief, and Commitment. THREE Autobiographical Sketch: Josiah G. CHATHAM: Memorandum for Novice Intellectuals. FOUR Autobiographical Sketch. Joe M. COOPER: aphical Sketch. History, Philosophy, and the Christian Faith. FIVE Autobiographical Sketch. Richard C. JOHNSON: Douglass, Washington, and Dubois: Representative Americans? SIX Autobiographical Sketch. Michael H. MITIAS: Another Look at the Ontological Status of the Aesthetic Object. SEVEN Autobiographical Sketch Jay T. KEEHLEY: Widgets and Bugs: Positivism Vindicated. EIGHT Autobiographical Sketch. Michael L. HARRINGTON: The Philosophy of War and the War in the Persian Gulf. NINE Autobiographical Sketch. William F. LAWHEAD: Belief and Understanding. Some Common Misinterpretations of Hegel. TEN Wallace A. MURPHREE: Autobiographical Sketch. Faith for Atheists and Agnostics. ELEVEN Autobiographical Sketch. Louis P. POJMAN: Reflections on Ethical Relativism and Ethical Objectivism. TWELVE Autobiographical Sketch. Theodore G. AMMON: A Footnote to Pyrrhonian Skepticism. THIRTEEN Autobiographical Sketch. RITA C. HINTON: Proper Names: Is It Possible for the Listener to Disambiguate? FOURTEEN Autobiographical Sketch. Bennie R. CROCKETT, JR.: Empirical Implications for the Divine Command Theory of Ethics. FIFTEEN Autobiographical Sketch. FORREST E. WOOD, JR.: Thoreau: Vegetarian Hunter and Fisherman. SIXTEEN Autobiographical Sketch RONALD E. BISHOP: Is This It? Immortality in Charles Hartshorne's Neo-Classical Theology. SEVENTEEN Autobiographical Sketch. David M. HOLLEY: Can Life Goals Be Rationally Chosen? EIGHTEEN Autobiographical Sketch. Kristen BROWN: Aristotle Saying First Principles and Apparent Contradiction. NINETEEN Autobiographical Sketch. Steven G. SMITH: Resembling Intentions and Human Kinds. INDEX.
About the Editor
Bennie R. Crockett, Jr., is professor of philosophy and religion, William Carey College, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, USA. He is the author of articles addressing the intersection of philosophy and biblical studies, this is his first book.
Sample Page (p. 28):
(from Robert E. Bergmark, “Knowledge, Belief, and Commitment”)
28 ROBERT E. BERGMARK
know. If “to know that something is the case,” means “to know for sure that something is the case,” then one can never be in error about knowledge. Using such a definition of knowledge, we cannot say that human beings once knew the planet Earth to be flat rather than spherical. We can only say that we human beings once believed that such was the case, but now we know that our former belief was in error. In such a setting, things we know take on a different status from things we only believe. Things “known” are provided with an aura of objectivity, while things “believed” are supposed to have no more than a subjective status.
If one adopts the meaning of knowledge as reasonable probability—that which one can rea-sonably believe—then the split between knowledge and belief disappears. The quest for knowl-edge is no longer a quest for absolute certainty, but a quest for reasonable beliefs. Error is possi-ble, indeed likely, because we are fallible in our quest for knowledge. Our senses can deceive us, our reasoning mislead us, and our memory fail us. If we are able to accept the fact that error has occurred, then as Josiah Royce pointed out, we have admitted our ability to distinguish what we call truth from what we call error.
Degrees of reasonable probability extend across a continuum of belief and knowledge. The higher the degree of reasonable probability that I assign to a given claim, the more likely I am to use the term “know,” rather than “believe.” If I have a minimum of evidence or a shaky argu-ment, I am more apt to say I believe that something is the case. If I have a great amount of sig-nificant evidence and a very strong argument, I am more apt to say I know that something is the case. If I do not expect that my claim will be challenged, I am more apt to say I know. If I expect it to be challenged, or if it actually is challenged, I am more apt to say I believe. What all of this demonstrates is that there is no sharp discontinuity between what I claim to believe and what I claim to know. What we are talking about then is reasonable belief. What we have not yet done is define the term “reasonable.”
Before we define “reasonable,” it is important to say something about the intellectual cli-mate within which the reasonable can be recognized and appreciated, and the terms by which it will be interpreted. The fact that each of us, as we grow, passes through a long, slow process of intellectual development has long been recognized. Recognized also is the fact that what seems reasonable to us at any given moment is related to our stage of development at that time. The plaintive excuse, “It seemed like a good idea at the time,” is a case in point, and illustrates also the fact that the reasoning process often benefits from having more time to reach a reasonable conclusion, as well as from having more experience on which to base that conclusion. It is the fact of the process of development itself that concerns us here.
Over the past half-century significant studies have been undertaken to provide empirical documentation of how this development occurs. The Gesell...
|
|
|
Tijnmuiden 7
1046 AK Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T: +31-20-611 48 21
F: +31-20-447 29 79
248 East 44th Street - 2nd floor
New York, NY 10017
USA
T: 1-800-225-3998
F: 1-800-853-3881
Toll-free in the USA
info@rodopi.nl
|
|
|
